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Abstract. We study the competitive equilibria of a simple economy with moral hazard
and intermediation costs. Entrepreneurs can simultaneously get credit from two types
of competing institutions: ‘ﬁnancial intermediaries’ and ‘local lenders’. The former are
competitive ﬁrms issuing deposits and having a comparative advantage in diversifying
credit risks. The latter are individuals with a comparative advantage in credit arrange-
ments with a ‘nearby’ entrepreneur. Because of intermediation costs, local lenders
are willing to diversify their portfolio by oﬀering some direct lending to nearby en-
trepreneurs. We show that, in some cases, a fall in intermediation costs, by inducing
local lenders to choose a safer portfolio, reduces entrepreneurs’ eﬀort and increases the
probability of default. In these cases, taxing intermediaries may be welfare-improving.
JEL Classification Numbers. A10, D80, G10, O17. Keywords. Financial inter-
mediation, moral hazard.
1. Introduction
Overview. It is often observed that ﬁrms or individuals borrow simultaneously from
diﬀerent sources. In some cases, agents may be able to sign loan contracts with more
than one bank or hold multiple credit cards. In other cases, they may sign a loan
contract with a bank and, then, issue bonds or raise additional funds from informal
credit institutions (such as moneylenders, extended families et cetera). Evidence of these
phenomena for small business in the United States is provided by Petersen and Rajan
[25, 26] and, for less developed countries and informal credit markets, by Hoﬀ and Stiglitz
[16, 17].
The issue of simultaneous lending raises important questions concerning the nature
and the eﬃciency of competitive allocations in ﬁnancial markets. When loan contracts
have some eﬀects on the borrowers’ incentives (to exert eﬀort or to default) and lenders
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cannot observe the borrowers’ asset position, competition between lenders may generate
non-internalized externalities (e.g., Pauly [24], Helpman and Laﬀont [15], Bizer and
DeMarzo [10], Arnott and Stiglitz [5], Kahn and Mookherjee [18]). These externalities
may be responsible for a wide range of observed phenomena, from the LDC debt crises
and the ‘over-borrowing syndrome’ (Kletzer [19], McKinnon and Pill [21]) to the high
interest rates/excessive borrowing prevailing in some markets (Bizer and DeMarzo [10],
Kahn and Mookerjee [18] and Parlour and Rajan [23]). The ability of lenders to monitor
borrowers’ trades and liabilities or to enforce contract exclusivity requires sophisticated
institutions, the eﬃciency of the judicial system and centralized information (such as
credit bureaus). These characteristics are typically missing in less developed countries
and, as noted by Kahn and Mookerjee [18] and other authors, they may be missing in
developed countries as well.
Most of the literature on this subject has analyzed environments where lenders are
identical. In these cases, externalities can be eliminated by preventing the borrower
to sign multiple contracts. However, lending institutions have diﬀerent characteristics
and they compete by specializing in diﬀerent activities. In particular, a small local
bank (or credit cooperative) may be better than a large intermediary at monitoring a
borrower’s behavior, whereas a large intermediary may be better at diversifying loans
and raise deposits. Under these conditions, allowing agents to borrow simultaneously
from diﬀerent lending institutions could be an eﬃcient outcome and characterizing the
contractual arrangements by which externalities can be eliminated is harder than in more
standard environment.
In this paper, we provide a model of a ﬁnancial market with competing credit insti-
tutions which may either concentrate their activity in some local environment (‘local
lenders’) or operate in the global market (‘ﬁnancial intermediaries’). The diﬀerentiation
between these institutions is based on the idea that, while local lenders, by special-
izing with a subset of borrowers, can save on intermediation costs (which may arise
from bookkeeping, enforcement, monitoring or transportation), ﬁnancial intermediaries
take advantage from credit diversiﬁcation. More speciﬁcally, our economy consists of a
large set of ‘villages’ (or ‘countries’), each of them populated by an entrepreneur (lo-
cal borrower), who operates an investment project with stochastic returns, and a risk
averse agent (local lender) endowed with some amount of a unique consumption good.
Allocations are subject to two types of imperfections. First, there is a moral hazard
problem, i.e., entrepreneurs can aﬀect the probability distribution of investment returns
by making a non-observable eﬀort. Second, trading arrangements between lenders and
borrowers are costly to establish outside local environments. These intermediation costs
are assumed to be insigniﬁcant only when trading involves ‘nearby’ local borrowers and
lenders (i.e., a local borrower and a local lender in the same village). Hence, local lenders
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avoid intermediation costs by specializing in a single contractual arrangement, but they
are subject to a risk of default. By operating on large numbers, ﬁnancial intermediaries
are able to completely diversify their credit risks and they oﬀer their liabilities as a safe
asset (deposits) to local lenders as a way of insurance.
The model is liable to at least two diﬀerent, though related, interpretations. Namely,
local lenders (ﬁnancial intermediaries) may be viewed as informal (formal) lending insti-
tutions. Alternatively, our model may describe a very simple multi-country economy with
large international ﬁnancial intermediaries interacting with national lending institutions.
The coexistence of formal and informal ﬁnancial arrangements is a key issue in devel-
opment economics and a well documented phenomenon in developing countries, where
the informal sector includes credit cooperatives and associations, moneylenders and ex-
tended families (see Arnott and Stiglitz [4], Stiglitz [29], Besley and Coate [8], Banerjee,
Besley and Guinnane [7]). However, local lenders can also be interpreted as small lo-
cal banks and credit cooperatives, which play an important role in many industrialized
economies. If interpreted as a multi-country economy, our model can be related to the
growing literature on international ﬁnancial integration and economic development (see
Kletzer [19], McKinnon and Pill [21], Dooley [11], Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz [14],
Aizenman [1]).
The way we model the behavior of local lenders and intermediaries is admittedly too
simple to capture the reality of ﬁnancial markets under the above interpretations. For
instance, as far as the formal/informal market interpretation is concerned, we sidestep
some of the interesting features characterizing non-market ﬁnance, such as long-term
interaction and peer monitoring.1 However, the simplicity of the model is motivated
by the attempt to analyze the general equilibrium implications of having competing
heterogeneous ﬁnancial institutions. This is an important step if we want to study a
variety of issues related to the impact of ﬁnancial development on growth and the eﬀects
of taxation policies on production and welfare.
Results. In our economy, ﬁnancial intermediaries are price takers, supply loans to lo-
cal borrowers imposing no quantity constraints and collect demand deposits from local
lenders. Local lenders act as principals with respect to the nearby entrepreneur by pro-
viding exclusive loan contracts. A competitive equilibrium is a set of contracts from local
lenders, an interest rate on loans from intermediaries and an interest rate on deposits
such that demand and supply of loanable funds are equalized. Nontrivial equilibria (i.e.,
1Informal ﬁnancial exchanges are mostly viewed as arising from a comparative advantage, within
small and fragmented local environments characterized by repeated interactions, in monitoring borrowers,
enforcing contracts and collecting information (see Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane [7] for a clear deﬁnition
of these terms).
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equilibria where local lenders and intermediaries are both active) are shown to exist, by
exploiting large numbers because of the usual lack of convexity due to moral hazard.
These equilibria are characterized by two relevant conditions. Namely, the marginal
product of capital is equal to the rate on loans oﬀered by intermediaries and this cannot
be lower than the repayment per unit of loan to a local lender. When the costs of
intermediation are suﬃciently high, the repayment rate to a local lender may be strictly
lower than the marginal product of capital, i.e., local lenders may be induced to oﬀer
credit at better conditions than intermediaries in order to increase the entrepreneurs’
eﬀort (the probability of success of the project). It follows that entrepreneurs’ eﬀort is
increasing in the share of total credit oﬀered by local lenders. Hence, a higher amount
of direct ﬁnance from a local lender may reduce the moral hazard problem. Depending
on the diﬀerent interpretations of the model, this result shows that non-market ﬁnance
or local ﬁnancial markets should play a larger role than they play in a competitive
environment. By the same token, entrepreneurs may end up borrowing too much from
formal or international ﬁnancial intermediaries.
This can be viewed as a version of a standard trade-oﬀ between the degrees of insurance
and moral hazard, although this trade-oﬀ arises from agents’ interactions in a general
equilibrium, instead of arising from the individual decision problem. The more are
local lenders insured against risk arising from direct investment, the less is the eﬀort
of the borrower in reducing risk implied by the contract. From a general equilibrium
perspective, the size of a local lender’s direct loan to a nearby entrepreneur is a function
of intermediation costs, since these costs are aﬀecting the opportunity cost of direct
lending (‘risk premium’). It follows that a higher intermediation cost, by reducing the
equilibrium deposit rate, may increase the local lender’s direct investment and raise
the entrepreneur’s eﬀort to reduce the probability of default. In other words, we have
shown an instance in which a fall in intermediation costs, i.e., an increase in ﬁnancial
development (a rising share of intermediated funds), may go along with an increase in
the risk of default.
Ineﬃciency of competitive equilibria arises since, when local lenders evaluate the bene-
ﬁt of a higher eﬀort, they ignore the favorable consequences of this action on the revenue
of intermediaries, which could produce a higher safe rate. In the ﬁnal section of the
paper, we discuss the policy implications of the model. Taxing ﬁnancial intermediaries
may induce a higher entrepreneur’s eﬀort for the same reasons why eﬀort may increase
with a rise in intermediation costs. Since the borrowers’ incentive compatible utility is
increasing in eﬀort, this tax policy is Pareto improving whenever it has a non-negative ef-
fect on local lenders’ utility. By collecting taxes where projects have been successful and
redistributing the total revenue back to local lenders irrespective of projects outcome,
the policy maker can compensate local lenders and produce a welfare improvement.
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2. Fundamentals
We consider a simple two-period, one-commodity economy with production. There is
a continuum of (uniformly distributed) identical villages, I = [0, 1], and every village is
populated by one (local) lender and one (local) entrepreneur (or borrower). Production
takes place in every village subject to an idiosyncratic technological shock: a village can
be in a good (successful) state, g, or in a bad (unsuccessful) state, b. Consumption only
occurs after uncertainty is revealed.
Entrepreneurs (or borrowers) are risk neutral and have no endowment. They have,
however, access to a standard production technology with risky returns: if k ≥ 0 is
investment, the outcome is f(k) in the successful state and zero in the unsuccessful
state. The probability of occurrence of the good state, p, depends upon an unobservable
eﬀort, e ≥ 0, supplied by the entrepreneur, that is, p = p (e). The eﬀort is costly for
entrepreneurs and is measured by a disutility function, v.2
Assumption 1 (Local Borrowers). The disutility function of eﬀort, v : R+ → R+,
is unbounded, smooth, smoothly strictly increasing and smoothly strictly convex, with
v (0) = 0 and lime→0 v′ (e) = 0. The probability function, p : R+ → [0, 1], is smooth,
smoothly strictly increasing and smoothly strictly concave, with p (0) = 0. The production
function, f : R+ → R+, is bounded, smooth, smoothly strictly increasing and smoothly
strictly concave, with f (0) = 0 and limk→0 f ′ (k) = ∞.
Given a borrower’s consumption in the successful state, y ≥ 0, and provision of eﬀort,
e, his expected utility is
p (e) y − v (e) ,
since there is no consumption in the unsuccessful state.
Local lenders have a strictly positive initial wealth, w, and are risk averse. Their con-
sumption, (cg, cb) ≥ 0, which is contingent on idiosyncratic states, is evaluated through
a standard expected utility,
p (e)u (cg) + (1− p (e))u (cb) .
where the indexes g and b refer, respectively, to the successful and to the unsuccessful
state.
Assumption 2 (Local Lenders). The Bernoulli utility, u : R+ → R, is bounded, smooth,
smoothly strictly increasing and smoothly strictly concave, with limc→0 u′ (c) = ∞.
2Here, and in the following, the qualiﬁcation ‘smoothly’ indicates that the property can be character-
ized by derivatives. For instance, for a smooth map f : R→ R, ‘smoothly strictly increasing’ (‘smoothly
strictly concave’) means f ′ > 0 (f ′′ < 0).
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The economy is also subject to transaction costs, of which we give a simple represen-
tation. Suppose that, in every village, some amount of resources, x ≥ 0, are collected
when production is successful (there are no available resources when production is un-
successful) in order to be redistributed uniformly across all villages. With no transaction
costs, the quantity p (e) x is the aggregate amount of collected resources that can be
redistributed, where e is the eﬀort supplied in every village and the Law of Large Num-
bers is used to eliminate risk. Transaction costs are represented by a single parameter,
1 > γ > 0, such that the amount of collected resources available for redistribution is only
(1− γ)p (e) x.
Remaining resources are somehow wasted in the collection process. However, direct
trades occurring in every village between the local borrower and the corresponding local
lender are not subject to transaction costs.
Assumption 3 (Transaction Costs). Trades across villages are subject to the transaction
cost γ and trades within villages are free of transaction costs.
The literal interpretation of transaction costs is technological, that is, they imply a
material destruction of resources. An alternative interpretation could be in terms of
information. Indeed, one could suppose that, with probability γ, an external observer
receive the signal of an unsuccessful state from villages that are instead in the successful
state. To make this interpretation consistent with our description, however, one should
also take into account the fact that each local borrower would anticipate this misper-
ception. A change in the model to accomodate for the consistency of this alternative
interpretation of γ would not substantially alter the results of the paper. For simplicity,
we stick to the technological interpretation.
3. The Supply of Effort
To facilitate presentation, it is useful to characterize the supply of eﬀort by a local
borrower ﬁrst. Since eﬀort cannot be observed, its supply is subject to a standard
incentive compatibility constraint. Namely, for given consumption, y, local borrowers
supply eﬀort so as to maximize their expected utility. Therefore, the supply of eﬀort is
e (y) = argmax {p (e) y − v (e) : e ≥ 0} .
This supply is shown to be a well-behaved single-valued map.
Proposition 3.1 (Supply of Eﬀort). The supply of eﬀort, e : R+ → R+, is a single-
valued continuous map. Moreover, it is continuously diﬀerentiable at all strictly positive
consumptions, y > 0. Finally, the indirect expected utility and the supply of eﬀort are
both strictly increasing in consumption. In particular, e′(y) > 0.
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Proof. For given consumption, y ≥ 0, the supply of eﬀort is given by
e (y) = argmax {p (e) y − v (e) : 0 ≤ e ≤ e¯} ,
where e¯ > 0 is such that p (e) y − v (e) < 0 for all e ≥ e¯. By the Maximum Theorem,
the maximum is achieved and, by strict concavity of V in e, it is unique. The Maximum
Theorem also implies that the supply of eﬀort is continuous in consumption.
Suppose that y > 0. It is easy to show that e (y) > 0. The optimal supply of eﬀort,
thus, satisﬁes the following ﬁrst-order condition,
p′ (e (y)) y − v′ (e (y)) = 0.
The diﬀerentiability of the optimal supply of eﬀort, then, follows from the Implicit Func-
tion Theorem, which also shows that e′ (y) > 0.
The last claim follows from the fact that expected utility is strictly increasing in
consumption. 
One of the simplest consequences of the above proposition is that consumption of
a local borrower, y, unambiguously determines the supply of eﬀort, e (y), under the
incentive compatibility constraint. In addition, if a local borrower can guarantee himself
some consumption, y0 ≥ 0, the participation constraint takes the simple form y ≥ y0,
which is equivalent to
p (e (y)) y − v (e (y)) ≥ p (e (y0)) y0 − v (e (y0))).
Finally, as consumption increases, the borrower’s supply of eﬀort and, hence, the
probability of success increases.
4. Constrained Efficiency
We now describe the set of (symmetric) feasible allocations. Feasibility character-
izes all the constraints that the planner’s allocations must satisfy, including incentive
constraints and transaction costs.
An allocation consists of a consumption for local borrowers in the successful state, y ≥
0, a direct transfer from every local borrower in the successful state to the corresponding
local lender, z ≥ 0, and an indirect transfer from local borrowers to local lenders, x ≥ 0.
The latter is interpreted as the amount of resources which are collected from all successful
villages and pooled together in order to be transferred to local lenders uniformly across
villages. Every allocation determines the supply of eﬀort, e (y), subject to incentive
compatibility constraint, as explained in the previous section. In particular, the planner
cannot directly observe eﬀort when choosing an allocation.
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An allocation is feasible if it satisﬁes the material constraints on resources,
y + x + z ≤ f (w) ,
that is, the total amount of resources transferred (directly or indirectly) to every agent
is less than or equal to the total amount of available resources.
Clearly, given an allocation, the consumption of local lenders, contingent on uncer-
tainty,
cg = (1− γ)p (e (y))x + z, cb = (1− γ) p (e (y))x,
is the amount of resources that is transferred to them directly, z, and indirectly subject
to transaction costs, (1− γ) p (e)x. Therefore, given a feasible allocation, one obtains
the expected utilities of each local lender and each local borrower.
A feasible allocation is said to be (constrained) eﬃcient, or a social optimum, if it is
not Pareto-dominated by an alternative feasible allocation. The deﬁnition is a simple
adaptation of a standard notion in the literature. In particular, we remark that eﬃciency
here already takes into account asymmetric information as well as transaction costs. One
could, in principle, allow for contingent indirect transfers to local lenders. However, we
rule out this possibility to make (constrained) eﬃcient allocations more comparable with
market allocations (as it will be clear in the next section where market allocations are
deﬁned).
We now characterize eﬃcient allocations through ﬁrst-order conditions. Clearly, be-
cause of the non-convexity due to moral hazard, such conditions might not be suﬃcient
for a social optimum.
Proposition 4.1 (Constrained Eﬃciency). An eﬃcient allocation satisﬁes y + x + z =




1− (1− γ) p
(1− γ) p ,(1)
pu′g ≥ p′e′
(
ug − ub + u′gx
)
.(2)
In particular, the direct transfer is strictly positive, that is, z > 0.
Proof. The exhaustion of product, y + x + z = f (w), follows from the monotonicity of
agents’ preferences. Condition (1) follows from a slight change in the eﬃcient allocation
of the form (y, x, z) → (y, x− δ, z + δ), with δ ≥ 0, which implies a marginal variation
of local lenders’ expected utility,
pu′g − pu′g (1− γ)p− (1− p)u′b (1− γ)p ≤ 0.
The inequality follows from the optimality of the initial allocation. If z = 0, then the
above inequality reduces to γ ≤ 0, a contradiction. Hence, one is allowed to consider
δ ≤ 0 and the conclusion follows. Condition (2), instead, evaluates the derivative of the
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expected utility of local lenders along the marginal change (y, x, z) → (y + δ, x, z − δ),
with δ ≥ 0, which makes each local borrower strictly better oﬀ. The variation of local
lenders’ expected utility is
p′e′ug − p′e′ub + pu′g (1− γ)p′e′x + (1− p)u′b (1− γ)p′e′x− pu′g ≤ 0.
Again, the inequality follows form the optimality of the initial allocation. Using the
previous ﬁrst-order condition, one obtains the conclusion. 
These conditions are easily interpretable. Equation (1) states that the marginal rate
of substitution between bad and good state consumption must be equal to the ‘distorted’
marginal rate of transformation between the two goods, where the distortion arises from
transaction costs. Since γ > 0, one immediately derives the implication that the planner
is willing to insure local lenders partially (i.e., cg > cb) since, because of transaction
costs, the implicit price of insurance is not fair.3 Condition (2) establishes that the
marginal beneﬁt to the local lender of a rise in the direct transfer (the left hand side of
the inequality) must exceed the marginal cost (the right hand side). The former is given
by the expected marginal utility of good state consumption, the latter is given by the
eﬀect on expected utility due to a loss of eﬀort. Notice that this marginal cost can be
decomposed into two parts. The ﬁrst part, p′e′ (ug − ub), is the diﬀerence between the
utilities of good and bad state consumption (direct eﬀect of a rising eﬀort). The second
part, p′e′u′gx, is the eﬀect on expected utility of a rise in indirect transfers, (1− γ)px,
through a rise in the supply of eﬀort (indirect eﬀect of a rising eﬀort). We will see later
on, when the concept of a competitive equilibrium will be deﬁned, that the ineﬃciency
of competitive allocations and the desirability of a tax-transfers policy arises from the
agents’ failure to internalize the indirect eﬀect of a rising eﬀort through the market
mechanism.
An eﬃcient allocation is always characterized by the coexistence of direct and indirect
transfers, z and x, respectively. Direct transfers are positive because, with γ > 0,
local lenders are only partially insured. Indirect transfers are positive because local
lenders must be guaranteed some consumption in the bad state. Hence, in contrast with
some other contributions to the literature on incentives with competing lenders (such as
Bizer and DeMarzo [10] or Kahn and Mookherjee [18]), eﬃcient allocations require that
borrowers’ transfers to investors take two diﬀerent forms: direct and indirect transfers.
3Notice that, even if we allowed for contingent indirect transfers, partial insurance of local lenders
would still obtain at eﬃcient allocations.
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5. Markets and Contracts
Competitive markets operate as follows. Local borrowers can trade in loans: they
can obtain any amount of credit, a ≥ 0, at a (gross) rate of interest, r > 0, to be
repayed only if production is successful. Local lenders can trade in deposits: they can
invest any amount of wealth, d ≥ 0, in a safe asset, which pays oﬀ an uncontingent
(gross) rate of interest, ρ ≥ 0. We refer to r and ρ as the rate of interest on loans and on
deposits, respectively. Both rates of interest are prices to be determined at a competitive
equilibrium.
There is a large ﬁnite set of intermediaries. These are competitive ﬁrms which take
positions in loans and deposits at given prices. If an intermediary provides a loan, a, to
every village, the expected revenue is
(1− γ)p (e) ra,
where e is the supply of eﬀort which is taken as given by the intermediary. In oder to
provide such a loan, the intermediary must raise an amount of deposits equal to the
amount of provided loans, a. Hence, the cost of this provision of loans is ρa. It follows
that the proﬁt of the intermediary is
(1− γ) p (e) ra− ρa.
This description implies that the term of each contract (interest rate and loan size),
traded in the ﬁnancial intermediaries’ market, are common across borrowers and in-
dependent of the transactions made by borrowers with other lenders. By following
this approach (recently adopted by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [13], Dubey and
Geanakoplos [12] and Bisin and Gottardi [9], among others) we make the model consis-
tent with the idea that ﬁnancial intermediaries operate in a large competitive market
with limited information about the identity of borrowers, where assets are thought of as
‘pools’ (a deﬁnition taken from Dubey and Geanakoplos [12]).
In every village, there is a bilateral trade between the local lender and the correspond-
ing local borrower. This determines local contracts, given the rates of interest prevailing
in the market, which have been described above. Every local lender, acting as a principal
with respect to the corresponding local borrower, proposes an exclusive contract to the
corresponding local borrower. Such a contract speciﬁes a the loan from intermediaries,
a ≥ 0, an additional loan directly provided by the local lender, b ≥ 0, and a repayment
to be made directly to the local lender, z ≥ 0, in the case of successful production only.
At the given rate of interest charged by intermediaries on loans, r, a contract, (a, b, z),
allows local borrowers to consume
y = f (a + b)− ra− z,
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if production is successful. The outside option for local borrowers is not to accept the
contract proposed by the local lender and to demand credit only to intermediaries. The




Indeed, if a local borrower refuses the proposal of the corresponding local lender, a loan
can be still demanded to intermediaries.
Every local lender chooses an investment in deposits, d ≥ 0, and a contract, (a, b, z)≥
0, so as to maximize expected utility,
p (e) u (dρ + z) + (1− p (e))u (dρ) ,
subject to a budget constraint,
(3) b + d ≤ w,
an incentive compatibility constraint,
(4) e = e (y)
and a participation constraint,
(5) y = f (a + b)− ra− z ≥ max
k
f (k)− rk = y0.
Contracts solving this problem, for given rates of interest, are referred to as optimal local
contracts.
A competitive equilibrium (or, simply, an equilibrium) consists of a rate of interest on
deposits, ρ > 0, a rate of interest on loans, r > 0, and a local contract, (a, b, z), such
that the following three properties are satisﬁed:
(a) the local contract, (a, b, z), is optimal;
(b) intermediaries make no proﬁt, i.e.,
(1− γ)p (e) ra− ρa = 0,
where e is the supply of eﬀort induced by the optimal local contract;
(c) markets clear, i.e.,
a + b = w.
The requirement of strict positivity of the rate of interest on deposits is material, for,
otherwise, trivial equilibria with inactive intermediaries would always obtain at ρ = 0.
This feature is common to other economies in which contracts are traded on competitive
markets.
Because of the non-convexity due to moral hazard, the uniqueness of local contracts, as
well as convex values of the related correspondence, might fail. This is a common feature
of economies with moral hazard. It follows that a competitive equilibrium (as deﬁned
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in the previous section) might not exist. Nevertheless, using a standard approach, one
could exploit the assumption of a continuum of local lenders to restore convexity and
deﬁne an extended equilibrium in which local contracts are heterogenous across villages
at equilibrium. It suﬃces to suppose that the entire population can be partitioned into to
sub-populations with local contracts possibly diﬀering across such sub-populations and
intermediaries making no proﬁt on average on the entire population. In the appendix
we deﬁne and prove existence of an extended equilibrium, that is, an extension of a
competitive equilibrium to the case in which the set of villages can be partioned into
subsets characterized by diﬀerent contracts.
6. Local Contracts
In this section, we carry out a partial equilibrium analysis. That is, we study optimal
local contracts between local lenders and local borrowers at given rates of interest. We
ﬁrst notice that optimal local contracts exist.
Proposition 6.1 (Existence). For every rate of interest on deposits, ρ ≥ 0, and every
rate of interest on loans, r > 0, optimal local contracts exist. As rates of interest vary,
the correspondence is upper hemi-continuous with compact values.
Proof. For given ρ ≥ 0 and r > 0, let G (ρ, r) be the set of all contracts, (a, b, z), which
satisfy the participation constraint,
y = f (a + b)− ra− z ≥ sup
k≥0
f (k)− rk = y0.
This correspondence, G : R+ × R++ → R+ × R+ × R+, has non-empty compact values
and is continuous: non-empty values are obvious; compact values easily follow from
the boundedness of production and the strict positivity of r; continuity can also be
established using continuity of production. The Maximum Theorem then implies non-
emptiness and upper hemi-continuity of optimal choices. 
Having ascertained the optimal local contract exists, we now characterize them through
a ﬁrst-order condition approach. We remark again that ﬁrst-order conditions are only
necessary for the optimality of such local contracts.
Proposition 6.2 (Characterization). For a given rate of interest on deposits, ρ > 0, and
a given rate of interest on loans, r > 0, every local contract, (a, b, z), fulﬁlls the following
conditions. (a) If pr > ρ, then local leaders provide a direct funding to corresponding
local borrowers, that is, w > b > 0. (b) If a > 0, then the marginal product of capital
is equal to the rate of interest on loans, that is, f ′ = r. (c) The participation constraint
implies rb ≥ z and it is not binding only if rb > z. (d) If w > b > 0, a > 0 and z > 0,
then







pu′g ≥ p′e′ (ug − ub) ,(7)
where the latter holds with the equality if the participation constraint is non-binding, i.e.,
rb > z.
Proof. (a) By Inada conditions, w > b ≥ 0, for, otherwise, local lenders would not
consume in the unsuccessful state. Suppose that b = 0 and, for small enough δ ≥ 0,
consider the reallocation (a, b, z) → (a− δ, b + δ, z + rδ), leaving the local borrowers’
eﬀort unaltered. Since such reallocation cannot increase local lenders’ utility,
−pu′gρ− (1− p)u′bρ + pu′gr ≤ 0,
which amounts to satisfy ρ ≥ pr since u′g = u′b, a contradiction. (b) Since a does
not directly enter local lenders’ expected utility, its only eﬀect goes through the local
borrowers’ supply of eﬀort. If b = 0, then z = 0: the condition must be satisﬁed, for,
otherwise, the participation constrain would be violated. If b > 0, then z > 0: the
derivative of the local lenders’ expected utility with respect to a is
p′e′
(
f ′ − r) (ug − ub) .
Since p′e′ (ug − ub) > 0, the result follows. (c) Obvious. (d) Condition (6) is obtained
by considering any small reallocation (a, b, z) → (a− δ, b + δ, z + rδ), that leaves the
local borrowers’ eﬀort unaltered. Condition (7) corresponds to any small reallocation
(a, b, z) → (a, b, z + δ). Such reallocation cannot increase local lenders’ utility, but if the
participation constraint is binding, it is subject to δ ≤ 0, motivating the inequality in
the ﬁrst-order condition. 
The amount of direct funding, a, is determined so as to maximize the net output,
f (a + b)− ra, in the successful state. This serves the direct interest of both local bor-
rowers and local lenders and it obviously implies that the marginal product of capital is
equalized to the rate of interest of loans. In addition, since intermediaries supply loans
without quantity constraints, the rate of interest on loans determines the reservation
value for local borrowers. It follows that the implicit rate of interest that is charged by
local lenders on their direct loans to local borrowers cannot exceed the rate of interest
that is charged by intermediaries on indirect loans, that is, rb ≥ z.
Optimal local contracts are of two types, ‘binding’ and ‘non-binding’, according to
whether, respectively, the participation constraint is satisﬁed with equality and strict
inequality. Equivalently, binding and non-binding optimal local contracts arises whenever
rb = z and rb > z, respectively. These contracts are designed to obey two purposes,
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portfolio diversiﬁcation and incentive creation, as reﬂected by two distinct ﬁrst-order
conditions, (6) and (7).
Wealth is allocated according to condition (6), which states that marginal rate of
substitution between bad and good state consumption equals a measure of the spread
between the marginal product of capital, r, and the deposit rate, ρ (a risk premium).
The local lender chooses a risky portfolio, 0 < b ≤ w, as long as the risk premium is
positive, that is, pr > ρ. In turn, this inequality always hold in equilibria with a > 0,
where ρ = (1− γ)pr < pr.
The incentive to borrowers and, hence, the probability of success of the project are
determined by the evaluation of the marginal beneﬁt and cost associated with an increase
of the repayment, z, as shown by condition (7). This is equivalent to condition (2), except
for the last term on the right hand side of the equation (which we labeled indirect eﬀect
of a rising eﬀort), completely missing in condition (7). For the interpretation of these
conditions we refer to the discussion in section 4.
Notice that a competitive equilibrium with intermediation may well involve only bind-
ing contracts for local lenders. In such a case, indeed, credit from local lenders and
intermediaries are perfect substitute for a borrower. The case which we shall focus on,
however, is that of a competitive equilibrium in which local lenders provide funds to
borrowers which, though rationed in size, bear a more favorable implicit rate of interest,
that is, local lenders equilibrium contracts are non-binding.
7. Comparative Statics
We now explore the eﬀect of a varying value of the intermediation costs on the equi-
librium probability of a successful investment project. Our aim is to point out that an
increase in transaction costs may raise the average probability of successful projects. For
this purpose, we carry out a competitive statics exercise around a competitive equilib-
rium such that optimal contracts supplied by local lenders are (locally) smooth in all
relevant parameters.
Locally, around a smooth equilibrium, the equilibrium eﬀect of a change in transaction
costs can be examined in the (p, ρ)-plane studying the intersection of the zero-proﬁt
condition,
(1− γ)p (e) r− ρ = 0,
and the map p = p (e (ρ)) which locally gives the success probability implicitly chosen by
local lenders through contracts for a varying deposit rate, ρ. Then, comparative statics
reduces to the following observation (also exempliﬁed by ﬁgure 1).4
4Here and in the following, the derivatives with respect to endogenous parameters (such as the deposit
rate and, later on, the subsidy) capture the (parametric) behavior of local lenders, whereas the derivatives
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Proposition 7.1 (Eﬀect of Rising Transaction Costs). Locally, at a smooth equilibrium
with non-binding local contracts, if eﬀort smoothly decreases in the deposit rate (that is,
∂e/∂ρ < 0), then equilibrium eﬀort is smoothly increasing in transaction costs (that is,
∂e/∂γ > 0).








(1− γ) r − pr.














which is positive if ∂e/∂ρ < 0. 
The result is a consequence of the trade-oﬀ faced by local lenders between insurance
and borrowers’ incentives. If local lenders reduce borrowers’ incentives when they face
a higher return on the safe asset, then higher transaction costs require a lower deposit
rate for the zero-proﬁt condition to be satisﬁed.
To be more speciﬁc about the conditions implying a drop in the equilibrium eﬀort as
transaction costs are reduced, we decompose the optimization problem of local lenders
into two parts and use some Monotone Comparative Statics methods (Milgrom and
Shannon [22]).
Monotone Comparative Statics Theorem. Let f : X×Y → R, where X and Y are
intervals of R. Then argmax {f (x, y) : x ∈ X} is (weakly) increasing in y if and only if
f satisﬁes the single crossing conditions in (x, y). In addition, if f is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, the single crossing condition is satisﬁed whenever ∂2f/∂x∂y ≥ 0.
At equilibrium rate of interest on loans, r = f ′ (w) > 0, t = rb − z ≥ 0 is a local
borrower’s ‘opportunity gain’ from getting a local contract relative to the ‘market’ equi-
librium interest payments if optimal local contracts are non-binding. The supply of eﬀort
depends on the contract only through the value of t, that is, e = e (y0 + t) = e (t). Of
course, the premium to borrowers is restricted by 0 ≤ t ≤ rw, for, otherwise, local lenders
would obtain negative consumptions. The decomposition operates as follows. The ﬁrst
part consists of choosing the investment on the risky asset, b (t, ρ), at given supply of
eﬀort, e = e (t), so as to maximize the expected utility of local lenders, that is,
b (t, ρ) = argmax
{
U (b, t, ρ) :
t
r
≤ b ≤ w
}
,
with respect to exogenous parameters (such as transaction costs and, later on, the tax rate) represent
equilibrium adjustments.
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where
U (b, t, ρ) = p (e (t))u (ρ (w − b) + rb− t) + (1− p (e (t))) u (ρ (w− b))
The above is a standard portfolio choice problem with a tax, t ≥ 0, in the successful
state. The second part consists of choosing local borrowers’ opportunity gain, t ≥ 0,
and, hence, the supply of eﬀort, e = e (t), so as to maximize the indirect expected utility,
W (t, ρ) = U (b (t, ρ) , t, ρ). The solutions to this sequence of problems are equivalent to
the solutions of the original problem.
By the Monotone Comparative Statics Theorem, verifying that the supply of eﬀort,
e, is locally decreasing in the deposit rate, ρ, amounts to verifying that the indirect


















(r − ρ) ∂b (t, ·)
∂ρ
,
where Mj = −u′′j /u′j is the absolute measure of risk aversion and all derivatives are
evaluated at the equilibrium with non-binding local contracts. If intermediation costs
are high enough and the absolute risk aversion is, say, bounded, the ﬁrst term of the
above expression is negative. Therefore, a suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium success
probability to be locally increasing in intermediation costs is that the local lender’s
risky investment, at given probability, is locally decreasing in the safe return, that is,
∂b (t, ·)/∂ρ < 0. This seems a rather plausible assumption.
In ﬁgure 2, we present a simulation where a rise of γ has a negative eﬀect on the local
lender’s expected utility and a positive eﬀect on eﬀort. Restrictions are the following:
p(e) = e, u(x) = 2x1/2, f(w) = 8.5, f ′(w) = 1.5, w = 5.
We plot the local lender’s indirect expected utility function, W , for the ﬁrst part of
the decomposed optimization problem, so that, for a given value of ρ, the maximum
of W (·, ρ) gives the optimal local lenders’ eﬀort. The ﬁgure shows that W (·, ρ) shifts
downward and to the right when ρ goes from 0.4 to 0.6. By computation, one can show
that there is a smooth equilibrium with e = 0.7, when γ = 0.63.
8. Welfare and Taxation
Ineﬃciency. Competitive equilibria might be (constrained) ineﬃcient. We ﬁrst point
out that ineﬃciency is not due to a misallocation of indirect, x = ra, and direct, z,
repayments. That is, no Pareto improvement can be obtained by a balanced reallocation
of x and z.
Proposition 8.1 (Under-Provision of Eﬀort). An equilibrium allocation cannot be Pareto
dominated by a feasible allocation involving the same supply of eﬀort.
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Proof. Suppose that (y, x, z) is an equilibrium allocation, where x = ra, and is strictly
Pareto dominated by a feasible allocation (y′, x′, z′) involving the same supply of eﬀort,
that is, y = y′ . It follows that x′ + z′ = x + z. Let a′ be such that ra′ = x′ and set
b′ = w−a′. If z′ ≤ rb′, then the alternative contract, (a′, b′, z′), satisﬁes the participation
constraint and, by hypothesis, makes local lenders strictly better oﬀ, leaving the welfare
of local borrowers unaltered. Observe that
z′ = x + z − x′ = ra + z − ra′ ≤ ra + rb− ra′ = r (w − a′) ,
which suﬃces to show a contradiction. 
Thus, an ineﬃcient competitive equilibrium involves under-provision of eﬀort. Ineﬃ-
ciency arises since, when local lenders evaluate the beneﬁt of a higher eﬀort, they ignore
the favorable consequences on the revenue of intermediaries, which could be exhausted
by a higher deposit rate.
Proposition 8.2 (Ineﬃciency at Equilibrium). An equilibrium with non-binding local
contracts is ineﬃcient.
Proof. It follows from a comparison of ﬁst-order conditions at equilibrium and at an
eﬃcient allocation. 
Moving from the latter conclusion, we show below that a taxation policy might indeed
be beneﬁcial when competitive equilibrium local contracts are non-binding.
Taxation Policy. A potential role for taxation emerges when there are transaction costs,
since the competitive equilibrium allocation is not constrained eﬃcient when local con-
tracts are non-binding at equilibrium. We consider the case of a taxation on the revenue
of intermediaries.
Let τ be a small proportional tax on the revenue of intermediaries and s an uncon-
tingent transfer to local lenders. The determination of local contracts is only modiﬁed
by the presence of this additional small subsidy. Because of taxation, the proﬁt of an
intermediary becomes
(1− τ) (1− γ) p (e) ra− ρa.
An equilibrium requires, in addition, a balanced public budget,
(1− τ) s = τρa.
To evaluate the consequences of taxation, we carry out a comparative statics exercise
moving from a smooth equilibrium with non-binding local contracts and no taxation.
A taxation policy is welfare improving if and only if it increases equilibrium eﬀort.
Indeed, the tax induces an adverse eﬀect on the expected utility of local lenders, through
a fall of the deposit rate, and a beneﬁt, through an increase in the subsidy. At constant
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plans, the overall eﬀect on the expected utility of local lenders is neutral, since, being
public policy balanced, the cost is completely compensated by the beneﬁt. If eﬀort
increases at equilibrium, however, the policy generates a surplus by increasing the subsidy
comparatively more than the associated drop in the return on deposits.
Proposition 8.3 (Welfare and Eﬀort). At a smooth equilibrium with non-binding local
contracts and no taxation, an increase in the tax rate is smoothly welfare improving if
and only if it induces a smooth increase in equilibrium eﬀort (that is, ∂e/∂τ > 0).
Proof. By the Envelope Theorem, the marginal impact of an increase in the tax rate on
the expected utility of local lenders is, at equilibrium,
(








where we make use of the fact that the participation constraint is non-binding. Since
equilibrium imposes
























which proves the proposition. 
A taxation policy, in turn, increases equilibrium eﬀort whenever the supply of eﬀort
is downward sloped in the deposit rate. The latter conditions, however, is not necessary
for a welfare improving taxation policy.
Proposition 8.4 (Welfare Improving Policy). Locally, at a smooth equilibrium with non-
binding local contracts and no taxation, if eﬀort smoothly decreases in the deposit rate
(that is, ∂e/∂ρ < 0), then equilibrium eﬀort smoothly (weakly) increases in the tax rate
(that is, ∂e/∂τ ≥ 0).
Proof. Locally, equilibria are smooth functions of the policy parameter, τ , which satisfy
the following system of equations
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(1− γ) r − ρ.














where all the derivatives are evaluated at the smooth equilibrium with non-binding local
contracts and without taxation. It then suﬃces to show that (∂e/∂s) a− ∂e/∂ρ ≥ 0.
Notice that the derivative (∂e/∂s) a− ∂e/∂ρ evaluates the adjustment of plans as the
parameters (ρ, s) vary along changes of the form (ρ′, s′) = (ρ− φ, φa). Using the already
discussed decomposition of the optimization problem of local lenders, one obtains the
indirect expected utility, W (t, φ) = U (b (t, φ) , t, φ), where
b (t, φ) = argmax
{
U (b, t, φ) :
t
r
≤ b ≤ w
}
and
U (b, t, φ) = p (e (t))u ((ρ− φ) (w − b) + φa + t) + (p (e (t))) u ((ρ− φ) (w − b) + φa) .
(As φ and t are close to their equilibrium values, we neglect further boundary conditions.)
Therefore, by the Monotone Comparative Statics Theorem, (∂e/∂s) a−∂e/∂ρ ≥ 0 when-
ever, around an equilibrium, ∂2W/∂t∂φ ≥ 0. By direct computation,
∂2W
∂t∂φ




Applying again the Monotone Comparative Statics Theorem, one shows that ∂2U/∂b∂φ ≥
0, so proving that ∂b (t, ·)/∂φ ≥ 0. This concludes our argument. 
Taxation can be welfare improving since, by lowering the deposit rate, it induces a
reallocation of the portfolios of local lenders in favor of direct funding to local borrowers.
The increase in the riskiness of portfolios, in turn, obliges lenders to reduce the repay-
ments of direct credit. Lenders avoid the adverse consequences of a more risky portfolio
since they are compensated by uncontingent lump-sum transfers.
9. Concluding Remarks and Related Literature
We have considered an economy where entrepreneurs can simultaneously get loan
contracts from two sources, ﬁnancial intermediaries and local lenders. The former have a
comparative advantage in the diversiﬁcation of risks and the latter have a cost advantage
when lending to a local entrepreneur. Because of moral hazard, an increase in the cost
of intermediation may induce entrepreneurs to choose safer projects. This eﬀect comes
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about because a higher cost of intermediation implies a fall of ﬁnancial intermediaries’
ﬁnance and an increase in the amount of direct ﬁnance from local lenders, who oﬀer credit
at cheaper conditions. We have also proved that market allocations fail to internalize an
externality between lenders and, by taxing intermediaries, a policymaker can generate a
Pareto improvement.
The constrained ineﬃciency of competitive allocations in the presence of moral hazard
is a well known possibility. Constrained eﬃciency can be recovered only if agents are
able to observe individuals’ trades in goods, assets or insurance. In particular, when loan
contracts have some eﬀects on the borrowers’ incentives (to exert eﬀort or to default) and
lenders cannot observe the borrowers’ asset position or enforce contract exclusivity, com-
petition between lenders may generate non-internalized multilateral externalities (e.g.,
Pauly [24], Helpman and Laﬀont hellaf, Bizer and DeMarzo [10], Arnott and Stiglitz
[5], Kahn and Mookherjee [18]). This explains why the full observability of individuals’
trades is crucial for the eﬃciency results obtained by Prescott and Townsend [27] or
Kocherlakota [20] in competitive equilibrium models with moral hazard.5
Many authors claim that the amount of information required to generate constrained
eﬃciency may be very high and diﬃcult to implement in reality (see the informal dis-
cussion in Stiglitz [30]). In particular, implementing contract exclusivity requires so-
phisticated ﬁnancial institutions and eﬃcient monitoring agencies. The problem may be
particularly severe with respect to ﬁnancial transactions taking place in less developed
countries (frequently characterized by the coexistence of formal and informal credit), sov-
ereign debt and, in some cases (e.g., for small business or credit card markets), economies
characterized by well developed ﬁnancial systems.
More speciﬁcally, the possibility that non-market ﬁnancial institutions may have a
positive role in developing economies has been explored in Arnott and Stiglitz [4] in a
model with market and non-market insurance provision (‘peer monitoring view’). In
this model there is a market for insurance where exclusive contracts are not enforceable.
Moral hazard implies that the optimal incentive scheme is characterized by partial insur-
ance. However, intermediaries operating in the formal market are unable to implement
this contract since agents can get additional unobservable insurance from some informal
institutions with superior monitoring ability. The eﬃciency gain arising from this moni-
toring activity may more than compensate for the eﬃciency loss caused by the assumed
market failure (contract non-exclusivity). More general models of insurance and moral
hazard with non exclusive contracts are in Pauly [24], Helpman and Laﬀont [15] and
Arnott and Stiglitz [5]. The mechanism explaining ineﬃciency in our model, however,
5Kocherlakota [20] explains that the full information of agents’ asset holdings and the way this informa-
tion is used to generate eﬃcient allocations is compatible with perfect competition under the assumption
that full information and contract enforcement is delegated to a ‘monitoring agency’.
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cannot be fully understood as a case of over-insurance as in these contributions. In the
models by Pauly [24], Helpman and Laﬀont [15] and Arnott and Stiglitz [5], constrained
ineﬃciency would persist even with risk neutral agents. In our model, on the other hand,
all competitive equilibria would be constrained eﬃcient if local lenders were risk neutral.
In this case, intermediaries would not be active at equilibrium and every local lender
would act as a principal with respect to the corresponding local borrower. The latter
would provide a socially optimal contract. Even when local lenders are risk averse, local
borrowers supply positive eﬀort in our model, since they have no access to insurance
markets.
Bizer and DeMarzo [10] and Kahn and Mookerjee [18] analyze an environment with
moral hazard in which agents may borrow sequentially from multiple lenders and they
establish that, because of moral hazard and the inability of the borrowers to commit
to obtaining only one loan, equilibria may be characterized by excessive borrowing and
too high interest rates with respect to the second best allocation. Our model mostly
builds on these contributions by assuming the existence of an economic environment in
which borrowing from multiple lenders simultaneously is possible and it may generate
ineﬃcient competitive allocations. However, contrary to Bizer and DeMarzo [10] and
Kahn and Mookerjee [18], we assume that lenders can fully enforce contract exclusivity
with respect to any alternative loan contract oﬀered by a competing lender. In our
model, ineﬃciency does not arise from the lender’s inability to monitor the borrower’s
individual transactions, but from his inability to monitor the transactions of lenders
who are simultaneously lending to the same borrower. This problem can never arise in
models where lenders are all identical, since, in this case, contract exclusivity eliminates
the possibility that an individual can simultaneously borrow from diﬀerent sources. In
our model, on the contrary, lenders are assumed to be heterogeneous and the presence
of a transaction cost aﬀecting lenders asymmetrically implies that allowing an individual
to borrow simultaneously from diﬀerent sources may be an eﬃcient outcome. In some
sense, our model describes a situation in which eﬃcient ﬁnancial contracting could be
implemented by letting a principal (a ﬁnancial intermediary) oﬀering a contract to two
agents simultaneously (a local borrower and a local lender).
In other words, whereas most agency models of ﬁnancial relationships are either as-
suming that a lender is unable to enforce exclusive lending privileges or that he is unable
to monitor the borrower’s transactions in other markets, our model focuses on the diﬃ-
culties of devising eﬃcient contractual arrangements when ﬁnancial relationships require
the joint action of diﬀerent type of lenders.
The ineﬃciency arising in our model could be related to the fact that local lenders and
ﬁnancial intermediaries are price takers and make anonymous trades in the market for safe
assets (deposits and diversiﬁed loans). More speciﬁcally, we rule out the possibility that
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ﬁnancial intermediaries act strategically by making a take-it-or-leave-it contract oﬀer
to borrowers and local lenders to be accepted or refused simultaneously by borrowers
and local lenders in each village. However, it is unlikely that this type of contractual
arrangement can be realized in practice. The problem is that, in our model, there exists
a direct externality between agents (local lenders and borrowers in the same village).
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, we think that the model can be improved to address
some of the issues related to ﬁnancial opening in international environments. A large
literature on this topic has focused on the role of moral hazard and ﬁnancial market
imperfections to understand why opening up developing countries to short-term capital
inﬂows may increase the chances of ﬁnancial crises (see Kletzer [19], McKinnon and Pill
[21], Dooley [11], Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz [14], Aizenman [1]). This literature is
mainly concerned with the possibility of over-borrowing as a consequence of moral hazard
when investors believe that they will be bailed out of bad investments by taxpayers.
According to some authors (Rodrick [28], Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz [6] and
Aizenman [2]), there is some evidence that ﬁnancial opening does not have positive
eﬀects on growth and that it may increase the chances of ﬁnancial crises. Our model
captures an over-borrowing syndrome (from ﬁnancial intermediaries) arising from a non
internalized externalities between ‘local’ and ‘global’ lenders.
Appendix
An extended equilibrium consists of a rate of interest on deposits, ρ > 0, a rate of
interest on loans, r > 0, and a pair of local contracts, (a1, b1, z1) and (a2, b2, z2), such
that, for some (µ1, µ2) ≥ 0 with
∑
i µi = 1, the following three properties are satisﬁed:
(a) every local contract, (ai, bi, zi), is optimal;
(b) intermediaries make no proﬁt on average, i.e.,∑
i
((1− γ)p (ei) rai − ρai)µi = 0,
where ei is the supply of eﬀort induced by the corresponding optimal local con-
tract;
(c) markets clear, i.e., ∑
i
(ai + bi)µi = w.
The proof of existence of an extended equilibrium is simple since the loan rate equalizes
the marginal product on social investment, which implies market clearing. The only
binding restrictions are, consistently, the optimality of local contracts and the zero-proﬁt
conditions for intermediaries.
Proposition 9.1 (Existence). An extended equilibrium exists.
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Proof. Set r = f ′ (w) > 0, which ensures market clearing, and consider the correspon-
dence
Λ (ρ) = {(1− γ) p (e (f (a + b)− ra− z)) r − ρ : (a, b, z) is optimal at (r, ρ)} ,
which is well deﬁned on S = R+. This is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence with
non-empty compact values. In addition, maxΛ (0) > 0 and minΛ (ρ) < 0 for some large
enough ρ > 0. Let
S+ = {ρ ∈ S : maxΛ (ρ) ≥ 0} ,
S− = {ρ ∈ S : minΛ (ρ) ≤ 0} .
If S+ ∩S− = ∅, then we have a non-trivial partition of S into two non-empty closed sets
(these sets are closed by the upper hemi-continuity of Λ), which is a contradiction since
S is connected. It is then easy to show that proﬁts can be made zero in correspondence
of any ρ ∈ S+ ∩S− by choosing a probability measure (µ1, µ2) over at most two optimal
contracts, if needed, one implying non-negative proﬁt and the other non-positive proﬁt
for intermediaries. 
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The eﬀect of an increase in intermedation costs
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Figure 2
Indirect expected utility U∗ (e, ρ).
Curve above: ρ = .6, γ = .42. Curve below: ρ = .4, γ = .63.
